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The Imagined Seeing Thesis 
 
Paisley Livingston 





Wilson deliberates at length over the merits and demerits of what he calls the Face-to-Face, 
Modest, and Mediated versions of the Imagined Seeing Thesis. He ends up somewhat tentatively 
advocating one of several distinct variants of the Mediated Version. Very briefly, the Face-to-Face 
Version has it that when watching a cinematic fiction, we imagine ourselves to be in the presence 
of the events in the story. The Modest Version suggests that our imaginings are indeterminate or 
blank with regard to the question of how it is that we are seeing the fictional items when we 
experience a film. The Mediated Version holds that viewers imagine seeing and hearing items in 
the fictional world, and that spectators should also imagine that this seeing and this hearing are 
mediated or indirect. 
 
By what means is this indirect presentation achieved in the story? In the variant on the Mediated 
Version that Wilson says he accepts, “the means or mechanism that constitutes the mediation is, in 
general, fictionally indeterminate” (79, fn.). 
 
A key assumption here is that the fictional content of a work is partly determinate, but is also 
“gappy” or has “spots of indeterminacy” (as Roman Ingarden put it). I have long found Wilson’s 
mobilization of this idea with regard to aspects of fictional narration highly insightful, since good 
film appreciators do not get entangled in the sorts of issues that Kendall L. Walton evoked in the 
“silly questions” section of Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990: 174–182). I do wonder, however, 
whether Wilson has provided sufficient grounds for his preferred thesis concerning which 
imaginings about fictional mediation are and are not warranted. 
 
Warrant and justification are terms that Wilson does not hesitate to apply to some of the 
imaginings occasioned by works of fiction. To begin to understand the rationale behind the 
recourse to these epistemological terms in this context, we need only consider Wilson’s example of 
Flannery, who watches moving pictures depicting a black Porsche, but somehow ends up with the 
wonky impression that it is as if she were seeing a werewolf. As Wilson puts it, Flannery’s 
response lacks warrant or justification because it is not attuned to “the actual contents of the film 
images” (2010: 70). Imaginings like Flannery’s are insufficiently grounded in or guided by the 
relevant evidence. Wilson delineates what he calls a “veridicality condition” on the spectator’s son 
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delineates what he calls a “veridicality condition” on the spectator’s experience (70–71), linking 
this to Walton’s idea of authorized games of make-believe. Wilson’s veridicality condition basically 
restates the distinction between warranted and unwarranted spectatorial impressions, without 
specifying what it is in general that provides such warrant. A few pages later Wilson describes the 
situation with regard to the status of Flannery’s impressions: “It is an impression whose specific 
content is validated or not depending on what she sees more narrowly on screen” (74). I am not 
sure what is and is not embraced by this idea of a more narrow seeing. Is this expression simply 
meant to be synonymous with seeing “the actual contents” of the image, or what the image 
actually depicts, or what can be “perceived” in the image? And more generally, what are the 
assumptions about warrant, justification, or even truth (“the veridical”) underwriting this sort of 
judgment about a viewer’s imaginings? 
 
Suppose, now, that in some odd fictional context, it is true in the story that a magician is in cahoots 
with a werewolf and uses awesome magical powers to make the werewolf temporarily look and 
move just like a black Porsche. In such a context a spectator could see the same moving pictures 
that Flannery saw, yet, unlike Flannery, be warranted to imagine that it is true in the story that he 
“sees” a werewolf moving along the road, even though what he actually sees in that part of the 
film is a moving image depicting a black Porsche. That he would in such a case imagine seeing a 
black Porsche, and not a werewolf, makes it clear that we must follow Wilson in distinguishing 
between the fictional content of the work and what the spectator is prescribed to imagine seeing. 
In other words, some of what we are warranted to imagine or make-believe as part of the story is 
not part of what we are warranted to imagine seeing, and vice versa. It is important to recognize 
that this distinction is not only motivated by arcane philosophical examples. In watching films, we 
often see such things as lap dissolves, in which one shot fades out while another shot fades in. 
Such visible cinematic devices involve uptake of content and may be indicative of fictional goings 
on (sometimes they suggest a temporal ellipsis, for example), but even in such cases, what is 
perceived (one view progressively getting lighter superimposed onto another view getting darker) 
does not correspond precisely to what is happening in the story. 
 
The application of a broad yet crucial distinction between warranted imagined seeing and 
prescribed story content is sometimes straightforward, but often not. It is especially problematic 
when it comes to that part of a work’s content that pertains to the “internal” or fictional 
presentation of story events (or what Wilson generally calls the “narration”). How much of this 
sort of thing do we appropriately imagine seeing, as opposed to appropriately imagining “more 
broadly”? Just how much imagining should spectators engage in when it comes to the 
presentation or narration, within the story itself, of what happens in the story? Is there a 
principled link between imagining narration and adequate appreciation of the film as a work of 
art? 
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With these very broad and difficult questions in mind, consider some different ways spectators 
might respond to a particular case. Buster Keaton’s black and white film, Go West (1925), includes 




Later in the film, Friendless puts on a devil costume in order to get some bulls to chase him. For 
these scenes to have a “verisimilar” motivation along conventional “the bulls saw red” lines, we 
must imagine that the bandana and devil costume are red. I believe Wilson would agree that we 
should make believe or imagine that these items are red even though we do not imagine seeing 
them as red. And what should we imagine with regard to the presentation of such scenes? With 
regard to black and white films in general, Wilson writes that “The black and white presentation is 
simply grasped as the result of a mediation between me [the spectator] and the ‘objective’ fictional 
world” (90). According to the favored “weak elaboration” of the Mediated Version, the spectator 
should imagine that there was some kind of fictional mediation that filtered out the colors while 
visually presenting the events, but the viewer should not imagine anything more about how this 
filtering and presenting took place. With regard to the aforementioned scenes from Go West, this 
would mean that we should not try to answer silly questions about the point of view shot taken 
from a position “astride” a charging bull, such as “Whose perspective is this?” or “How can we be 
seeing Friendless as if we were moving towards him on the back of a charging bull?” 
 
g towards him on the back of a charging bull?” Compare, then, the following concocted sample 
reports from spectators who have watched the relevant bits from Go West:  
(1) The bulls chased the man because he was wearing red. Somehow in the world of the story the 
chase was presented by black and white moving images. 
(2) The bulls chased the man because he was wearing red. L’imagier ou l’équipe d’imagiers in the 
story presented the chase with black and white movie-like images. Working against the 
constraint of using only black and white images, l’imagier or collaborating imagiers cleverly 
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warranted an inference to the redness of the man’s devil costume. 
 
Response (1) squares with Wilson’s favored “weak” variant on the Mediated Version, whereas 
response (2) is in line with a more robust variant. Both (1) and (2) stand in contrast to a more 
sparse report that would be more in keeping with what Wilson calls the Modest Version of 
Imagined Seeing (3): 
(3)  The bulls chased the man because he was wearing red. 
 
The key argument against (3) is that it is silent on some of the evidence, such as the fact that the 
presentation was in black and white, which is something that ought to figure within the spectator’s 
warranted, comprehensive imaginings, at least, that is, if we accept the proposition that a spectator 
could be expected to reason that the absence of a normal perceptual experience of colors implies 
that the seeing was somehow mediated. 
 
If that much is correct (and I am not here asserting that it is), on what grounds could we 
reasonably be expected to settle on either (1) or (2)? What, more generally, is our evidence for 
reasoning about this part of the work’s content? Part of the evidence for any such claim is what we 
literally see and hear in the audio-visual display, but that cannot be all there is to it, since the 
fictional content of a cinematic work (including the story and its narration) is not equivalent to, or 
uniquely based on, what is literally seen and heard in an audio-visual display. From the fact that 
the spectator has “narrowly” seen a sequence of black and white moving pictures it does not 
follow that the spectator should imaginatively reason that it is true in the story that the events 
were presented by black and white moving pictures. It could be true in the story, for example, that 
an experience just like that of watching some black and white moving pictures was caused by 
means of some wizardry or advanced technology 
 
In the absence of a better overall account of the determination of fictional content, it is hard to see 
how the choice between (1), (2), (3) or other kindred imaginings could be settled decisively. 
Consider now another option, illustrated by a fourth report: 
(4) The bulls chased the man because he was wearing red. The filmmakers have worked against 
the constraints of black and white film stock and cleverly prompted an inference to the 
redness of the man’s devil costume. 
 
The absence of colors is for the competent and informed spectator a familiar feature of black and 
white photography in the actual world, and not necessarily to be reasoned about as the vestige of 
some obscure story-internal mediation. Good appreciators of movies pay attention to attributes of 
the audio-visual presentation such as color, grain, focus, aspect ratio, depth of field, and editing, 
and they are warranted to think of these features in terms of the filmmaking strategies of the actual 
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filmmakers who have been operating within the constraints of available cinematic technology. 
This warrant derives in part from their justified interest in the cinematic artistry manifested in a 
given sequence, that is what the filmmakers managed to achieve given the constraints within 
which they were operating. So the audio-visual evidence that could seem to support a report of 
type (1) or (2) transfers readily to reports of type (4). 
 
With regard to (2), we do not normally have any good reason to engage in an autonomous or 
separate appreciation of the feats of imagined storytellers. Of course there are cases, such as All 
About Eve (1950) and Nabokov’s book, Lolita, where we are duly prompted to imagine something 
about an internal storyteller’s performance, but such imaginings are also meant to be carried over 
finally to the overarching authorial ledger, since it is the actual author or authors who should be 
praised or blamed for having devised and presented this fictional storytelling to us, with or 
without ironic intent. 
 
In drawing attention to the appeal of a response along the lines of (4), I remain aware that a 
standard objection would have it that (4) is incompatible with the thought that in the world of the 
story, the internal narration or narrator presents the story events as actual or true. This thought is 
sometimes deemed (a) indispensable, and (b) incompatible with thoughts about how actual world 
filmmakers have cleverly arranged or presented things, since such filmmakers, unlike les grands 
imagiers, know that it is just make-believe. 
 
In response to that anticipated objection, I confess to having failed to grasp the reason why the 
“told as true” operator has to be attached to our warranted imaginings about a narration, and 
indeed, it strikes me that artistically relevant aspects of some fiction films are incompatible with it. 
We can certainly make believe or imagine something without having to imagine that there is 
someone who believes it or someone or something that presents it “as true.” Instead, it could be 
sufficient to hold, based on the audio-visual and other evidence, that the actual filmmakers have 
effectively designed a film to prompt or invite us to imagine such-and-such. Such a condition is 
especially well suited to the meta-fictional and impossible imaginings that are clearly warranted in 
experiencing some cinematic works. A recent example is One Day (2011), in which the characters 
seem to interact causally with titles that are obviously designed to blur the diegetic/no-diegetic 
distinction. Some titles are meant to be outside the story world while giving us information about 
when the events in the story occur; other titles having this same function are clearly situated 
within the story world (e.g. they are visible on the screen of a laptop in the world of the story); still 
others are, impossibly, both within and outside that world, as when the young woman seems to 
strike and destroy some lettering that is otherwise diegetically unanchored and wholly out of 
place in the room where she is standing. 
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In short, I think response (4) is the way to go, and that if we are looking for a viable version of the 
Imagined Seeing Thesis, we have good grounds to prefer some “Film Appreciator’s Version” that 
would be attuned to such a response. With this in mind, I turn now to one of Wilson’s arguments 
against the Moderate Version and in favor of the Mediated Version. If I follow him cor rectly, the 
key thought here is that the Moderate Version can be rejected because it does not support a 
requisite contrast between diegetic and nondiegetic narrational items, where the titles in shots 
from Psycho (1960) are adduced as telling instances of the latter. The inscription “Phoenix, 
Arizona” is not visible in the story world, but is presented to us as part of the content of the 
mediating image and so apparently should be counted as part of the fiction-internal narration. 
Wilson suggests that the right thing to imagine is that these words have been “inscribed by some 
agency onto the imagined transparency of the film image to the dramatized situations” (93–94). 
The problem with the Modest Version is supposed to be that it cannot say how we draw a 
distinction between diegetic and nondiegetic items within “our imaginative apprehension of the 
shot” (94). 
 
In response to this contention, I find it highly dubious that anyone should be warranted or 
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required to imagine that words have been inscribed by some agency onto the imagined 
transparency of the film image. This is, it strikes me, a highly theory-laden proposition, and the 
choice of such a theory is underdetermined by the available evidence. Of course it is right to say 
that spectators should not think the words “Phoenix, Arizona” were hovering in the sky in the 
world of the story, but it is a leap from this negative condition to the idea that they should have 
the thought that some fictional agency wrote something on an imagined transparency of the film 
image. 
 
There is a far more plausible alternative to Wilson’s claim about these inscriptions, which is to say 
that the inscription is not part of any warranted imagining. It is, instead, something to be seen and 
understood in all correct tokens of the audio-visual display type of Hitchcock’s Psycho. The 
inscription’s meaning and import are recognized as part of the ordinary competent uptake of the 
perceptible features of the actual audio-visual display (just as we understand credits, subtitles, and 
titles in documentaries). Once understood, these indications can still serve as premises in thinking 
about the story content, just as scads of other background information about conventions, genres, 
authorial intentions and attitudes, and the ways of the world are used in competent reasoning 
about the contents of a fiction. This is the case, for example, in Wilson’s chapter on The Man Who 
Wasn’t There, as he refers to actual world interview statements with the Coen brothers, as well as 
to attributes of their other works, the idea being, I should think, that the thoughts and œuvre of 
these filmmakers have something to do with the attributes of this particular work, including its 
fictional status, generic affiliation (as pastiche), and fictional contents. There is, then, a sense in 
which we imagine story events as “true in the story” and as existing independently of actual world 
storytellers and audiences, but this is only part of our relevant imagining and thinking, and it 
cannot provide a sufficient basis for the competent spectator’s thoughts and reasoning about 
works and their contents. Imaginative r sponse to the fictional content of a film should be attuned 
not only to the internal story and narrational rationale, but to the appreciator’s awareness of the 
work’s effective design. 
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